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ABSTRACT 
Arguments from mathematical system t h e o r y  are used t o  show t h a t  t h e  
behaviorist-cognitivist d e b a t e  in psychology i s  ac tual ly  a non-issue: abstractly, 
t h e  two a r e  equivalent;  but  from t h e  standpoint  of a predic t ive ,  scientif ic theory  of 
b ra ins  and behav io r  only t h e  cognitivist program holds a n y  promise. 
After  a br ief  summary of t h e  a lgebraic  t h e o r y  of systems,  t h e  p a p e r  employs 
these  a lgebra ic  tools t o  p ropose  a functional means by which a bra in  (human o r  
ar t i f ic ia l )  may compactly s t o r e  and r e t r i e v e  information. This scheme is then  
extended to provide  a means f o r  t h e  genera t ion of thoughts  and emotions, as well. 
Finally, t h e  p a p e r  concludes with a discussion of t h e  interconnections between 
t h e  b ra in  model suggested h e r e  and a number of o t h e r  models proposed in t h e  
l i t e ra tu re .  
1. Introduction 
In t h e  e a r l y  19'70s, t h e r e  w a s  a brief f l u r r y  of activity d i rec ted  toward t h e  
t ranscr ipt ion of classical  system theory into t h e  terminology of ca tegory  theory .  
One of t h e  consequences of these  e f fo r t s  w a s  a par t i cu la r ly  c l e a r  and explici t  cla- 
r if ication of t h e  relat ionship between a n  input/output and a state-variable 
descr ipt ion of a dynamical process .  In category- theoret ic  terms,  they are 
adjoints. Thus, with each  input/output descr ipt ion t h e r e  is  automatically associ- 
a ted  a natural s ta te-var iable  description,  and  conversely.  In th is  sense ,  t h e  two 
descr ipt ions  a r e  abs t rac t ly  equivalent. 
Having been sensitized by a cer ta in  amount of reading and a s t rong personal  
in te res t  in problems of mind and human psychology, when I f i r s t  encountered t h e  
duality between ex te rna l  and internal  system descr ipt ions ,  my immediate thought 
w a s  tha t  such a resu l t  w a s  a systems version of t h e  behaviorist-cognitivist spli t  in 
psychology, and t h a t  p e r h a p s  t h e  system concepts  would provide a framework f o r  
consideration of th is  dichotomy in more formal and p rec i se  terms. During t h e  p a s t  
decade I have had occasion to periodically re-consider th i s  duality, each  time 
armed with somewhat more powerful system-theoretic tools provided by t h e  sub- 
s tant ia l  advances in mathematicz! syslerr. c;'er th is  period. The eccasion of 
th i s  meeting at t h e  systems in te r face  between bra in  r e s e a r c h ,  cognitive psychol- 
ogy and ar t i f ic ia l  intelligence provides t h e  opportunity t o  put  forward what 
amounts t o  a model f o r  abstract thought processes .  The deta i ls  of t h e  framework 
p resen ted  h e r e  are almost s u r e  t o  be  wrong; nonetheless,  I would be g rea t ly  (but 
not unhappily) su rpr i sed  if when t h e  final word is  written on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
bra in ,  t h e  general  concepts  presented h e r e  d o  not p rove  to b e  t h e  foundation upon 
which a working t h e o r y  of any brain ,  real o r  ar t i f ic ia l ,  i s  const ructed.  
The basic questions t h a t  t h e  p a p e r  addresses  a r e :  
1) d o  in te rna l  cognitive s t a t e s  exis t ;  
ii) if they  do, in what way do  they s t o r e  exper iences  as memory; 
iii) how d o  such  cognitive s t a t e s  i n t e r a c t  to produce  thoughts;  
iv) i s  i t  possible f o r  ar t i f ic ia l  devices  l ike  computers  and non-neuronal 
intel l igences to have mental s t a t e s ,  or are such s t a t e s  uniquely c h a r a c -  
t e r i s t i c  of human bra ins?  
The mathematical s t r u c t u r e  presented h e r e  provides  a framework f o r  t h e  abs t rac t  
consideration of t h e s e  mat ters .  Their  in te rp re ta t ion  f o r  real physical  b ra ins  
remains a topic f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h .  
Before moving o n ,  I want to emphasize t h a t  th i s  p a p e r  is  not  a n  a t t a c k  on 
behaviorism; on t h e  one  hand. i t ' s  f ru i t l e s s  to b e a t  a dead (o r ,  at l eas t ,  dying) 
horse ,  while on  t h e  o t h e r  hand t h e  system-theoretic arguments given h e r e  
s t reng then  t h e  behav io r i s t  school, at least to t h e  d e g r e e  t h a t  they show t h a t  
a b s t r a c t l y  behaviorism and a b s t r a c t  cognition a r e  t w o  s ides  of t h e  same coin. One 
s ide  contains mental s t a t e s ;  t h e  o t h e r  doesn't.  But t h e  coin cannot b e  sp l i t  a p a r t  
and t h e  t w o  halves  s e p a r a t e d .  The bes t  we can d o  is  to view i t  one  s ide  at a time. 
Our pr incipal  argument  i s  t h a t  one  view i s  more usqfu l  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r ,  not  more  
"correct" .  
2. Behaviorism. Structuralism and System Models  
Stimulated by t h e  genera l  philosophical idea of logical positivism which w a s  in 
vogue at t h e  time, in t h e  early-1920s John Watson made t h e  rad ica l  suggestion t h a t  
behavior  does  not  h a v e  mental causes.  This thes is ,  f u r t h e r  developed and modified 
by Hull, Sk inner  and o t h e r s ,  h a s  come to b e  t e rmed  p s y c h o l o g i c d  behav ior i sm.  A 
pr incipal  motivation f o r  adoption of t h e  behavior is t  view was to r i d  psychology of 
t h e  dualist  a t t i tude  t h a t  mind is  a non-physical enti ty,  somehow disjoint f rom t h e  
physical  brain.  The behavior is t  solution i s  t o  eliminate all notions of mind, mental 
s t a t e s  and mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f r o m  psychological investigation,  concentra t ing 
solely upon external ly  o b s e r v a b l e  s t imulus - response  behavior  p a t t e r n s .  
By t h e  early-1960s, i t  was recognized t h a t  both t h e  dualist  and t h e  behavior is t  
approach  to human behav io r  were  unat t rac t ive ,  and effort was focused upon 
developing a material ist  t h e o r y  of mind t h a t  allowed f o r  mental causes .  One such 
theory ,  termed logical behav ior i sm,  was qui te  similar  to class ica l  behaviorism and 
is  r ea l ly  just c lass ica l  behaviorism in a semantic form. Another theory ,  
c e n t r d - s t a t e  i d e n t i t y ,  postula tes  t h a t  mental events ,  states and p rocesses  are 
identical with neurophysiological  even t s  in t h e  bra in .  Thus, under  t h e  centra l -  
state identity theory ,  a behav io ra l  e f fec t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of a causal  p a t t e r n  of physi- 
cal even t s  in t h e  bra in .  The problem with t h e  cen t ra l - s t a t e  identity notion is  t h a t  
in e i t h e r  i t s  weak or i t s  s t r o n g  form, token and t y p e  p h y s i c d i s m ,  r e s p . ,  i t  asserts 
t h a t  a l l  mental p a r t i c u l a r s  t h a t  ex i s t  or could e v e r  e x i s t  are neurophysiological. 
Thus. t h e  logical possibility of machines and o t h e r  disembodied s p i r i t s  having men- 
tal p r o p e r t i e s  i s  ru led  ou t  because  they  are not  composed of neurons.  
During t h e  last decade  or  so ,  a way ou t  of t h e s e  dilemmas h a s  been provided 
by t h e  t h e o r y  of f u n c t i o n a l i s m ,  a n  outgrowth of t h a t  amalgam of physics,  neuro- 
physiology, computer sc ience  and psychology loosely labeled,  "cognitive science." 
Functionalism is based upon t h e  idea t h a t  a mental s t a t e  can  b e  defined by i t s  
causal  re la t ions  to o t h e r  mental states and t h a t  such mental states can,  both in 
principle and in deed,  b e  rea l i zed  by many systems. In essence ,  behavior  i s  dr iven 
by software,  not  hardware .  A v e r y  readab le  account  of these  va r ious  notions i s  
given in t h e  popular  a r t i c l e  by  Fodor [I] or t h e  books [2,3,22]. Since  i t  will not b e  
necessa ry  f o r  us  to distinguish between t h e  cen t ra l - s t a t e  identi ty t h e o r y  and func- 
tionalism, we adopt  t h e  g e n e r i c  t e r m  s t r u c t u r a l i s m  to r e p r e s e n t  any t h e o r y  of t h e  
mind t h a t  involves physical  mental s t a t e s ,  b e  t h e y  manifested in a human bra in ,  a 
disembodied cloud from s p a c e  or a collection of silicon wafers  in a machine. 
The principal  aim of th i s  p a p e r  is Lo provide a p r e c i s e ,  system-theoretic 
argument f o r  asse r t ing  t h e  abstract  equivalence of behaviorism and structuralism, 
while at t h e  same time showing t h a t  operationally only t h e  s t ruc tu ra l i s t  view 
of fe r s  t h e  basis f o r  a pred ic t ive ,  causal  view of human behavior .  Such a conclu- 
sion is  a natura l  consequence of t h e  so-called Realization Theorem of mathematical 
system theory.  Following t h e  pa th  laid out by t h e  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  framework,  w e  then 
provide a fair ly detailed mathematical description of t h e  way in which a ' b ra in"  
would process  and s t o r e  e x t e r n a l  stimuli in o r d e r  t o  g e n e r a t e  observed  behavioral  
responses.  The p a p e r  t h e n  concludes with some specula t ions  based upon t h e  
theory of system invar iants  f o r  how thoughts are genera ted  as consequences of 
internal  system dynamics. 
3. Stimulus-Response Patterns and External System Modeb 
Let us imagine o u r  information-processing ob jec t  0 (human being, machine. 
cloud, ...) as consisting of t h e  p roverb ia l  "black-box" connected t o  i t s  environment 
by ce r ta in  input and  output  channels  (Fig. 1). Assume t h a t  at any  given moment t , 
t h e  stimulus u ( t )  i s  se lec ted  from some set of symbols U, while t h e  observed 
response at tha t  moment, y ( t ) ,  belongs to ano ther  set of symbols Y. To simplify 
t h e  exposition, assume t h a t  t t a k e s  on only t h e  d i s c r e t e  values t = 0,1,2. o . 
Figure 1. Information processing object .  
Then a given stimulus-response pat tern of 0 ,  Bo, is  represen ted  by the sequence 
Bo = ( U  ( t ) , y ( t ) )  , t  = 0 , 1 , 2 ,  . . . 
If we let II denote the  set of all possible stimuli sequences, with l? representing the  
se t  of all response sequences, then the  overall e z t e r n a l  b e h a v i o r  of the object 0 
can be denoted by a stimulus-response map 
where 
while 
7 = tu ( 0 1 , ~  ( l ) , ~  . . . 1 , Y E ~ ,  y ( . ) r Y .  
According t o  t h e  behaviorists, all that can eve r  be known about 0 are the  se t s  
n and l?, together  with the  map I. The ent i re  content of t he  behaviorist program is 
t o  determine I, given R and r, without postulating any internal  mechanisms inside 
the box. Or, put another  way, a behaviorist would claim tha t  t o  be given I would 
be t o  be given everything tha t  could be known about t he  disposition of the  object 
t o  behave in a cer ta in  way, and tha t  i t  would be nonscientific t o  a s se r t  t he  
existence of any unobservable internal mechanism generating I. Mathematical 
system theory provides an  honest, t rue ,  c lear  and d i rec t  refutation of this claim. 
4. Cognitive States and Internal Models 
An internal model C of t he  behavioral pa t te rn  involves postulating t he  
existence of a set X of internal  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s ,  and a dynamic relationship g link- 
ing t he  stimuli u and the  s ta tes ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a ru le  h specifying how internal s t a t e s  
combine to genera te  the  response y .  More compactly, w e  have 
z ( t  ) E X ,  u ( t  ) E U, y  ( t )  E Y.  W e  would then say tha t  C Is an Internal model of the  
observed behavior I if t he  stimulus-response pa t te rn  BE = Bo, I.e., If t he  
observed input-output behavior of C agrees  with tha t  of 0. Note tha t  in o r d e r  fo r  
BE = Bo, i t  is necessary to construct  an appropriate  set X ,  together  with 
appropriate  maps 
From an  abs t r ac t  point of view, t he  f i r s t  s tep  in t h e  s t ructural is t  program is 
t o  ensure tha t  f o r  any given ex te rna l  model 0 = ( R , r J ) ,  a corresponding internal 
model C = (X,g , A )  exists. If this  is t h e  case,  then i t  would be  natural to associate 
the  abs t rac t  states X with t h e  postulated physical states of t he  brain in some 
fashion, while at t he  same time interpreting the  maps g and h as means for encod- 
ing and decoding external  stimuli and mental states, respectively. I t  is one of the  
g rea t  triumphs of mathematical system theory to have been able  t o  provide a 
r a t h e r  definitive resolution of this question, happily in t he  affirmative. The 
remainder of the  pape r  i s  devoted t o  an  account of this solution in t he  above con- 
text ,  together with a detailed exposition of how the  encoding/decoding operations 
are explicitly ca r r i ed  out, followed by some semi-speculative discussion of the 
process of cognition from a systems perspective.  
5. Realizations and Canonical Models 
Loosely speaking, w e  can phrase  the  behaviorist-structuralist  problem as fol- 
lows: 
Given  a s t i m u l u s - r e s p o n s e  p a t t e r n  Bo, f ind  a "good" i n t e r n a l  model 
C s u c h  t h a t  Bo = BE. 
The catch in t he  above statement is the  qualifying condition tha t  t he  model C be  
"good." I t  tu rns  out t ha t  without imposition of this condition t he  solution to the  
problem is trivially easy: t h e r e  a r e  an  infinite number of models C = CY,g , h )  such 
































